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Abstract. Secure systems have a reputation of being unusable and demanding on users,
a situation attributed to a lack of usability and human factors expertise among security ex-
perts. We argue that the issue of unusable security might have deeper roots. Indeed, the
design principles security relies on are out of touch with the reality of nowadays’ computing
practices. In particular, the security principles of least privilege and fail-safe defaults strip
human users of their ability to reconfigure systems and leave them stranded when facing
interaction breakdowns. Security principles therefore prevent the re-appropriation of sys-
tems they mediate both in unexpected practices and by unexpected users. We propose
several leads to lessen the negative impact of those principles on secure systems.
Introduction
Computer security lays its foundations on Saltzer and Schroeder (1975)’s ten empir-
ical security design principles. Those principles have been instrumental in enabling
security practitioners to produce secure systems. Security design principles seek
to constrain the space of possible designs and guide designers towards the least in-
secure design. However, traditional security mechanisms have been designed with
little knowledge of human factors, and have a reputation of treating their users as
‘enemies’ (Adams and Sasse, 1999). Usable security is a research field that draws
heavily from practical HCI. The role of usable security with regard to its parent
discipline is to evaluate and improve the usability of security mechanisms.
We will focus our discussion on two principles1. The principle of fail-safe de-
1 Owing to space constraints. However, the least-common mechanism could also be examined
under the light of universal access in support of appropriation by unanticipated users.
faults (PFSD) “means that the default situation is lack of access, and the protection
scheme identifies conditions under which access is permitted”. Security design and
policy authoring are error-prone activities, and preventing access to resources in
scenarios which have not been thought through is an effective method of avoiding
situations detrimental to the system’s security: “In a large system some objects will
be inadequately considered, so a default of lack of permission is safer”. The prin-
ciple of least privilege (PLP), similarly, states that “every program and every user
of the system should operate using the least set of privileges necessary to complete
the job”. Whilst the previous principle applies when the security consequences of a
specific configuration are unknown, the PLP is directly informed by a security re-
quirements gathering process and encourages designers to deny access to resources
mediated by the security mechanism as often as possible.
In ethnomethodology-inspired HCI, it is held that computer systems are unable
to fully capture, model and react to user contexts (Dourish, 2004; Chalmers, 2004;
Suchman, 2006). Dourish (2004) proposes that systems should expose their struc-
ture to users in ways intelligible to them, so that users can align them with the
settings of their activity at hand. Reconfiguration can be seen as the process of
making technology fit a practice, and is described by Suchman (2006) as one of the
constituents of human agency with regard to machines.
We observe that systems cannot both be reconfigurable and implement the se-
curity principles as they are laid out. Not only is reconfiguration out of reach but
the principles also, we argue, strip human actors of their agency by constraining
their ability to control their interaction with systems. Since reconfiguration affords
appropriation, it is the very core of security design practice that must be revisited
by HCI researchers, rather than the mere interface of existing security artifacts.
In the remainder of this paper, we develop on the reconfiguration-security con-
tradiction presented above, and we then propose courses of actions for security
designers to lessen the negative effects of the Saltzer and Schroeder principles.
Why Security Principles Compete with Appropriation
Chalmers (2004) provides a pragmatic overview of the role of designers with regard
to constraining the possible uses of designed artifacts. On the one hand, designers
constrain the types of couplings afforded to users (and thus the types of creative as-
sociations made between the artifact’s capabilities and the user’s problem at hand).
On the other hand, they must explicitly support the interpretation and appropriation
of tools, so that transparent use can be achieved:
“A system [...] necessarily involves underspecification of the situation of its use,
and therefore openness to interpretation and variability of its normative effect. [...]
People accommodate the characteristic affordances of a new tool, but they may also
appropriate it to suit the practices and priorities of their own contexts and communities
of use i.e. other, older tools and media, and other people.”
In contrast, PFSD explicitly states that all unanticipated uses must be prevented,
and PLP that only the resources necessary for performing the anticipated tasks
should be accessible. The ability to interpret and reconfigure the system is explic-
itly removed. Those two security principles require a specification of what activities
are legitimate for each authorised user, and a model of the applicable threats. The
PFSD constrains the use of the system to anticipated use scenarios, and the PLP
constrains the set of permitted actions on the system based on the threats at hand.
The externalities of the PFSD were deemed acceptable on the basis that users
will be able to detect and remedy denied accesses: “A design or implementation
mistake in a mechanism that gives explicit permission tends to fail by refusing per-
mission, a safe situation, since it will be quickly detected”. This reasoning has come
under question in the past decade. Users, say Adams and Sasse (1999), have a legit-
imate right not to be pestered and hindered by computer security mechanisms that
failed to account for their needs. Besides, they are not always able to remedy denied
accesses without detriment to their productivity (Bartsch and Sasse, 2013). In some
systems, only the initial configuration errs on the side of safety, and users are free
to reconfigure the system later on according to their needs. This interpretation of
the PFSD is one that we encourage and wish to make more explicit.
Re-Agencing Users in Principled Security
We propose to give opportunities for human actors to sustain interactions that would
otherwise be prevented by the Saltzer and Schroeder principles. The rationale for
stripping actors of their agency in the first place is that users should not be trusted to
make correct security decisions. Whilst we disagree with this assessment, a similar
case can be made that requiring users to think security decisions through consumes
too much of their time (Beautement et al., 2008) and is an unsustainable form of
interaction. Let us use a radical metaphor: Suchman (2006) stated that agency in
human-like machines is achieved via a “collaborative performance”, that involves
human actors who control the interaction arena of the machine:
“An encounter with Stelarc’s Head affords further evidence for the collective and con-
tingent nature of sociomaterial agencies. [...] I am struck by the sense of collaborative
performance involved, both within and beyond the gallery walls.”
If we were to return agency to the objectified users of security, could we provide
them with collaborating agents who can reconfigure the arena to their benefit?
Focus on User Practices before Technique
We security designers must keep in mind that the shortcomings discussed in this
paper arise from a lack of consideration of usability at the stages of requirements
gathering and ideation, and that usability research is not just a field of user-centered
evaluations, but also of design principles and processes. Ongoing research from col-
leagues Becker et al. (2015) hints that even organisations that proclaim to develop
usable security products are unaware of usability design processes.
We ought to rewrite security design principles to emphasize the goal of reconfig-
urability. We could rewrite the PLP to add an obligation for researchers to validate
that the most common and desirable practices at the time of design can be sus-
tainably performed within the proposed design. Robust methods to this end exist:
participatory design, value-sensitive design, and in-the-wild observations (includ-
ing critical incident reports, digital data collection, ethnographies) which can unveil
unanticipated practices and better document actual user populations.
Empower Users to Mediate Security Policies
Systems accurately configured to support the activities ongoing at the time of de-
ployment will not necessarily remain appropriate. Unexpected needs and accom-
panying practices will emerge. Users must thus possess efficient mechanisms to
inform the system – or its administrators – of such evolutions. In a series of inter-
views with employees of a large company, Bartsch and Sasse (2013) described how
ineffective security policy review mechanisms can hinder workers’ productivity and
force them to evade security mechanisms. Policy reviews are indeed best performed
on a local scale. As illustrated by Suchman (1995), it takes understanding and expe-
riencing the work settings of an individual to explain their – sometimes seemingly
illogical – work practices. Systems where users are empowered to make security
decisions can sometimes be beneficial: Mazurek et al. (2011) showed how users
were best able to decide whether to grant access to a resource when the requesting
party provided a situated justification for their request; Kirlappos et al. (2014) found
that employees have some motivation to engage in security-related behaviour, even
when they must give up on employers’ inflexible security mechanisms.
In other words, we must explicitly design both the security systems and their
sites of interaction to permit reconfiguration. We must think reconfiguration oppor-
tunities through, and understand and compensate for their security consequences.
For instance, a system that grants users access to a resource in a semi-public con-
text could allow them to delegate their access to a third party, endorsing the third
party’s actions (similarly to a guarantor scheme) to provide both flexible access
and assurance of accountability to the resource owner and the delegating user. In
general, the ability to amend or relax permission is beneficial to productivity and
appropriability goals, and should be provided when possible.
Even if policy mediation is to be decentralised and if users are to ultimately
set policy collectively, security experts have an important role to play in addressing
the mental models of non-expert users. Experts can provide high-level overviews
of what practices are beneficial or risky, and can provide arbitration. The key to
scalable permission management is to spare the expensive expert resource and make
full use of the knowledgeable local one.
Isolate and Make Dangerous Interactions Explicit
In the consumer world, fail-safe defaults and least privilege have been more rad-
ically applied in recent times. For instance, users of modern tablet and mobile
OSs are prevented from installing software from unofficial sources. Some email
providers prevent users from sending attachments deemed potentially dangerous.
These decisions are made to prevent real malware threats. Nevertheless, users may
need to send files which appear to be malicious but are not, or may need to use
in-house software on their personal devices that cannot be uploaded to an app store.
Partial technical solutions exist. For instance, untrusted applications could be
installed in confined environments, and users be required to explicitly give permis-
sion for each resource applications attempt to access. Why is that an improvement
over blunt denial? Currently, users prevented from using an application or docu-
ment can only drop out from using their device’s security model and switch to a
competing device, or they must reformulate or abandon their original goal. They
cannot resolve the interaction breakdown caused by the security mechanism, no
matter whether they are taking an actual risk or the mechanism is mistaken. Instead,
they could be offered explicit trade-offs: they can accept the drawbacks of the con-
finement mechanism (performance issues and the enforcement of present-at-hand
interaction) rather that disengage from security or fail to fulfil their expectations.
Since security mechanisms should be designed to support the assumed legiti-
mate activities of users, such tools should be needed rarely enough that users con-
tinue to rationalise their use and don’t fall prey to habituation. Besides, present-at-
hand use of technology is an integral part of users’ learning process, and so design-
ers could explicitly inform users about the cues they should be looking for, whilst
interacting with suspicious artifacts, in order to determine their legitimacy. If ha-
bituation occurs and interaction with isolating tools becomes ready-to-hand, users
must by then have been made able to not take unwarranted risks. Such situations
cannot be achieved accidentally; rather, designers will be required to explicitly con-
sider how users interact and co-evolve with systems, and whether the ways in which
systems are appropriated ultimately lead to insecurity. Methods such as participa-
tory design and in-the-wild deployment studies can provide such evidence.
Discussion
We observe that systems cannot both be reconfigurable and implement the security
principles as they are laid out. Since reconfiguration affords appropriation, we ar-
gue that at least some of the usability issues of security mechanisms originates in
security design principles. We call this the reconfiguration-security contradiction.
We suspect that the very core of security design practice must be revisited by
HCI researchers, rather than only the artifacts it has already produced. Both modern
investigation and design methods must be appropriated by security designers to
tackle such challenges, since mingling with the interfaces of mechanisms that are
likely to contain uncovered flaws in the interactions they afford may not suffice.
The reconfiguration-security contradiction is particularly noticeable when se-
curity mechanisms cause breakdowns to which users respond through disengage-
ment (Dourish et al., 2004; Bartsch and Sasse, 2013). We argue that the principles
at the core of security design encourage such responses by preventing reconfigura-
bility, and therefore other forms of breakdown solving. We propose designers to
explicitly identify potential breakdowns and design for their solvability by afford-
ing human users a richer range of actions. For instance, users can be offerred the
ability to reconfigure systems, or allowed to explicit perform dangerous interactions
– in which case designers should provide all the guidance and assurance they can.
Security principles have taken away the agency of human actors by forbidding
reconfiguration. It is no longer sufficient to state that users must not be treated as
enemies by security designers. Going further, they must not be treated as objects.
We must transit from a culture of experimentation on subjects to a culture of design
with agents. Such a shift in attitude might help us find a path towards building
security interactions that are meaningful, comforting and genuinely useful.
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